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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, amici make the following disclosures. Pinterest, Inc. does not have
a parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more
of its stock. Tumblr, Inc.’s parent corporation is Yahoo! Inc.; Yahoo! Inc.
does not have a parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation
owns 10% or more of its stock. Twitter, Inc. does not have a parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
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Pinterest, Inc., Tumblr, Inc., and Twitter, Inc. submit this amicus
curiae brief to explain some of the serious operational problems that the
district court’s misapplication of the DMCA’s red-flag knowledge provision creates for online services. By making it harder for service providers to obtain DMCA protection when they “interact” with usersubmitted content, the otherwise-thoughtful decision below threatens to
discourage providers from valuable activities like screening out objectionable content and making useful information easier to locate. This
Court should reject that result, which undermines Congress’s intent to
protect—and certainly not to deter—such responsible behavior by
online services.
INTEREST OF THE AMICI
Amici are leading online service providers that offer innovative
ways for users to express themselves by creating and sharing content.1
Pinterest, Inc. (“Pinterest”) is an online platform that allows
people to discover new things and engage with the people who create
them. Users gather images and other objects (known as “Pins”) from

Amici and their counsel are solely responsible for this brief. No one
else helped write it or contributed money for its preparation or submission. All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
1

1
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their own collections or from across the web and organize them in
themed collections called boards. As users browse the millions of boards
and more than 30 billion Pins available on Pinterest, they can Pin the
content they find onto their own boards, and follow the users and
boards they find most useful or inspiring.
Tumblr, Inc. (“Tumblr”) provides a platform for users to share
their artwork, writing, photos, audio, and video with a worldwide audience. Tumblr is home to over 195 million blogs and nearly 83 billion
posts. The platform allows users to connect with others who share their
interests, to explore new ideas and creative expressions, and form communities spanning culture, age, and geography.
Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) is a global platform for public selfexpression and conversation. Twitter has more than 255 million monthly active users who share approximately half a billion Tweets each
day. The unique format of the speech (Tweets are limited to 140 characters) encourages quick, spontaneous, real-time commentary about issues great and small.
In operating their services, amici rely on the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C.
2
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§ 512. Amici are the kinds of services for which the DMCA was designed. They provide open platforms where users can store and allow
others to view content of their choosing. They also allow users to “link”
to material hosted on other online locations. These activities are covered
by two separate DMCA safe harbors: Section 512(c) (“storage at the direction of a user”); and Section 512(d) (“referring or linking users to an
online location containing infringing material”).
Each minute of every day, hundreds of millions of users around
the world post all kinds of content on Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter.
This material allows users to express who they are, what they care
about, and what’s happening in their lives. The DMCA ensures that legitimate service providers will not as a matter of course face infringement claims based on such material. By balancing the interests of
online services, copyright owners, and the public, the safe harbors have
helped preserve copyright protection while allowing services like amici
to flourish. Amici have a strong interest in seeing that the DMCA is
properly applied, taking account of both Congress’s intent and the practical realities that online services face in interacting with usersubmitted content. Those interests occasion this brief.
3
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The DMCA’s knowledge provisions reflect Congress’s decision to
assign the primary responsibility of identifying online infringement to
copyright owners, not service providers. In this regime, “red-flag”
knowledge can exist only where a given infringement would be “obvious” to any reasonable person. This result is compelled by the DMCA
and confirmed by the case law. But there are also important practical
considerations that underscore why red-flag knowledge can be found only in limited circumstances.
Congress understood that identifying copyright infringement is
very difficult for online services. Determining whether a user-posted
item is infringing requires answering various factual and legal questions: Is the material protected by copyright? Who owns the relevant
copyright(s)? Who uploaded the item? Did a copyright owner authorize
the posting? Is it fair use? Service providers have limited, if any, relevant information on these matters. And these difficulties have only increased as online services such as Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter have
become home to ever more diverse content from users around the world.

4
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In enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized that copyright owners are far better able to determine whether their copyrights are being
violated. It crafted the statute’s knowledge standards so that service
providers don’t have to play detective or make judgment calls about infringement. If there’s legitimate uncertainty about whether a given
item is infringing, there can be no red-flag knowledge. DMCAdisqualifying knowledge can be found only where the facts known to the
service provider precluded any reasonable inference that the item at issue was authorized or qualified as fair use.
This strict standard is necessary because Congress did not want to
deter online services from interacting with user-submitted content.
While the DMCA makes clear that service providers are not required to
monitor their services, Congress recognized that services have compelling reasons for reviewing content on a voluntary basis. Responsible
services often try to limit the availability of material that may be illegal
or highly offensive—including obscenity, sexually explicit material, hate
speech, graphic violence, and bullying. Without these efforts, even the
best online platforms might get drowned in a sea of crude pornography
and fake Viagra ads. Interacting with user material also allows desired
5
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content to be found in the huge repositories of information that live
online. By sorting through and organizing users’ posts, service providers
can help users locate and identify the items that are the most relevant
and interesting to them.
Congress approved of these voluntary forms of content review and
intended the DMCA to make room for them. The legislative history specifically recognizes the “valuable role” that “human editors and reviewers” play in “assisting Internet users to identify and locate the information they seek.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (1998). And the limited
sweep of the statute’s knowledge provisions play a crucial role in this
regard. By relieving service providers of the need to guess about what
may be infringing, the DMCA gives providers the breathing room they
need to help users find what they want and avoid what they don’t want.
Misapplying red-flag knowledge puts all of this at risk. It subjects
service providers to a potential loss of safe-harbor protection virtually
any time they come into contact with user-submitted content. To avoid
that, providers would have to choose between avoiding user content altogether or removing anything that raises even a remote possibility of
infringement. Both options are fundamentally at odds with the DMCA.
6
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The first would at once leave online services toothless against the worst
kind of anti-social material while making it more difficult for users to
find useful content. The second would punish innocent users, silence a
host of lawful speech, and erode the open nature of the Internet.
Congress intended the safe harbors to resolve these dilemmas, not
exacerbate them. And the statute has worked. As the experiences of
amici show, the DMCA has helped make online services vital platforms
for free expression and creativity. The district court’s ruling on red-flag
knowledge threatens to undo those benefits. This Court should correct
that mistake and hold that Vimeo is entitled to summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.

Red-Flag Knowledge Plays An Appropriately Limited Role
In The DMCA Regime
In crafting the DMCA’s knowledge provisions, Congress declined

to require service providers to make “difficult judgments as to whether
conduct is or is not infringing.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 52. Instead, unless a service provider has actual (subjective) knowledge of infringement, it can be charged with knowledge only where it “turned a blind
eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.” Id. at 48; see also Viacom
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
7
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There is a “high bar” for finding red-flag knowledge. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1111 (C.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners
LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). The infringing nature of the material must be “apparent from even a brief and casual viewing.” H.R. REP.
NO. 105-551 (II), at 58 (1998). The “common-sense result of this ‘red
flag’ test” is that service providers are not “required to make discriminating judgments about potential copyright infringement.” Id. To the
contrary, “if investigation of ‘facts and circumstances’ is required to
identify material as infringing, then those facts and circumstances are
not ‘red flags.’” Veoh, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (citation omitted).2
Giving red-flag knowledge a limited role is fundamental to the
DMCA’s structure. Rather than require service providers to make tough
calls about infringement, the DMCA created a balanced notice-andtakedown regime that serves as the primary mechanism for online copCourts have repeatedly granted summary judgment to service providers where plaintiffs could not meet the DMCA’s strict standard for
red-flag knowledge. See, e.g., Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1020-26; Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113-15 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 74647 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Wolk v. Photobucket.com, Inc., 2014
WL 2723035 (2d Cir. June 17, 2014); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
2

8
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yright enforcement. Under this regime, copyright owners must provide
service providers with information (in a prescribed form) about what
particular material on their systems is infringing. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2)(3). When it receives a proper notice, the service provider must “expeditiously” remove the identified material (§ 512(c)(1)(C)) and can provide
the alleged infringer with a chance to submit a “counter notification”
explaining that the material does not infringe (§ 512(g)).
This system is efficient and effective. It provides a streamlined
process for removing suspected infringing material from online services.
It gives clarity to both service providers and copyright owners, setting
the stage for voluntary cooperation. It reflects the significant advantages that copyright owners have in identifying infringement of
their works. And it recognizes that not all suspected infringements are
actually infringing, allowing users to push back against overreach by
copyright holders.
In short, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime affords appropriate redress for infringement while letting legitimate service providers offer open platforms for user expression. Unilateral takedowns by
service providers have none of those virtues. It is not surprising there9

Case: 14-1048

Document: 79

Page: 19

07/30/2014

1282715

45

fore that Congress intended to confine the DMCA’s knowledge provisions to cases where the provider needs to exercise no judgment because
the infringing nature of the material is truly obvious.
II.

The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions Reflect The Practical
Difficulties That Online Services Face In Trying To Determine Whether User Material Is Infringing
The DMCA’s knowledge standards reflect a very practical reality:

it is extremely difficult for online services to determine, in the mass of
material submitted by their users, what items are actually infringing.
This fact makes it critical for courts to give red-flag knowledge the limited scope Congress intended it to have.
A.

Determining Infringement Requires Consideration Of Complex Factual And Legal Questions

Assessing copyright infringement is no easy task. “Infringement”
is a legal conclusion informed by an array of legal and factual questions:
•
Is the material protected by copyright or might it be in the
public domain? See generally Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873
(2012).
•
If it’s protected by copyright, who is the “author” of the
work? See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53 (1884) (discussing authorship requirement); Garcia v. Google,
Inc., 2014 WL 3377343 (9th Cir. July 11, 2014) (addressing
whether an individual actor’s performance in a movie is copyrightable and, if so, who owns the relevant copyrights).

10
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•
Who holds the copyright(s) in the work? Is the work coowned by multiple copyright holders? Has any author assigned or
transferred ownership of the copyright to someone else? See, e.g.,
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 475
(S.D.N.Y.) (defendant’s “lack of knowledge regarding true copyright ownership objectively reasonable” where ownership turned
on “complex analysis of contractual arrangements going back
twenty years”), opinion modified, 220 F. Supp. 2d 237 (S.D.N.Y.
2002), aff’d, 409 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2005).
•
Who uploaded the content to the service? Was the item uploaded by the copyright owner or its agent? See, e.g., Veoh, 665 F.
Supp. 2d at 1110 n.13 (evidence that a popular band uploaded one
of the band’s videos to online service sued for infringement).
•
If not, did the uploader have permission from any of the copyright owners to upload the work? Was there an express license?
An implied license? Did the copyright owner encourage or approve
the uploading of the work? See, e.g., Graham v. James, 144 F.3d
229, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Under federal law, ‘nonexclusive licenses
may ... be granted orally, or may even be implied from conduct.’”)
(quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A][7], at 10-43).
•
Even if the initial uploading was unauthorized, did the copyright owners know that the work had been posted and decide to
acquiesce in its presence there? See, e.g., Keane Dealer Servs., Inc.
v. Harts, 968 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (knowledge coupled with acquiescence can amount to implied license).
•
Even if the posting was unauthorized, is it a fair use of the
copyrighted material? 17 U.S.C. § 107.
These questions must be asked and answered each time an infringement determination is to be made. Copyright infringement, in
other words, isn’t like obscenity: you don’t just know it when you see it.

11
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This bears directly on the red-flag knowledge inquiry. As a matter of
law, an item is not infringing if it’s in the public domain, or if it was
posted by the copyright owner, or has otherwise been authorized by the
copyright owner, or if it’s a fair use. A service provider thus cannot have
actual knowledge of infringement unless it knows that none of those
things is true. Likewise, because red-flag awareness requires facts that
make “the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable
person” (Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31), such awareness does not exist unless
the answer to each of those questions is obvious. If there is a reasonable
basis for concluding that the item is in the public domain, or that it was
posted by the copyright owner, or that it appears with the copyright
owner’s express or implied permission, or that it’s fair use, there cannot
be red-flag knowledge.
It is no accident that the DMCA adopts such a stringent standard.
Congress understood that online services generally lack the information
needed to ascertain infringement. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 48 (explaining that a service provider “could not be expected” in a brief encounter with material online to determine whether it “was still protected by copyright,” “whether the use was licensed,” and “whether it was
12
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permitted under the fair use doctrine”); cf. Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Network,
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]here is no assurance that [the service provider] could have accurately identified the infringing content in question.”).
If anyone has the information necessary to answer these questions, it is the copyright owner. Rights holders know (or should know)
what works they own, to whom they’ve licensed those works, whether
and on what terms they want their material to appear on various online
platforms, and what uses they consider harmful to the market for their
works. Online services have little insight into any of these issues. It
thus makes sense that the DMCA does not “place the burden of determining whether [materials] are actually illegal on a service provider.”
Viacom, 676 F.3d at 32 (quoting Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1023).
B.

Determining Ownership, Authorization, And Fair Use Is Especially Challenging For Online Services

The operational environment faced by online services like amici
only make it more challenging for them to make the determinations of
copyright ownership, authorization, and fair use needed to have
knowledge of infringement under the DMCA.

13

Case: 14-1048

Document: 79

Page: 23

07/30/2014

1282715

45

Ownership. Services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter are
home to a massive and ever-increasing array of content from users
around the world. New postings pour onto these platforms every second
of every day in every language imaginable, referencing cultural trends,
personalities, news events, and political issues big and small, mainstream and niche, earth-shattering and banal. This material comes in
many different forms: text, images, videos, music, and spoken-word
files. Service providers often have little idea what much of this content
is, to say nothing of who owns the relevant copyrights. Indeed, it is often unclear whether material originates with a professional content
creator: in today’s culture, much of what looks or sounds professional
was actually made by amateurs, and vice versa.
Authorization. Similar problems beset online services in trying
to determine whether particular material is authorized by the rights
holder. Even if the user who posted an item did not create it, that user
may have obtained permission (whether through a licensing agreement
or something more informal) from a copyright holder to use the content.
(It’s become increasingly easy for users to obtain such permissions, including though Creative Commons licenses and other off-the-shelf li14
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censing regimes. E.g., https://creativecommons.org/licenses/.) Moreover,
the copyright in many works is shared by separate co-owners, each of
whom has the independent right to license use of the work. See Jasper
v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 334, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It
is basic copyright law that joint authors may legally grant a license to a
third party to exploit the work without co-author consent.”). And where
such an understanding exists between the user and a copyright owner,
the service provider is unlikely to know about it. But such arrangements belie any assumption that material not posted by the actual creator is necessarily unauthorized.
Compounding these difficulties are the actual practices of many
copyright owners, who often welcome the presence of their material on
user-submitted content platforms and take steps to encourage it. Artists
and media companies often post their content to online service, in many
cases without indication of where it’s coming from. See, e.g., Ethan
Smith & Peter Lattman, Download This: YouTube Phenom Has a Big
Secret, Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB118903788315518780 (describing singer signed by
major label who simultaneously was masquerading as an amateur on
15
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YouTube and MySpace). There are countless instances of movie studios,
television networks, and record labels authorizing their works to appear
on online services for promotional purposes outside the context of traditional licensing arrangements. See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen
Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling a Web of Deceit,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 421-22 (2010); Andrew M. Kaikati & Jack G.
Kaikati, Stealth Marketing: How to Reach Consumers Surreptitiously,
46 CAL. MGMT. REV. 6, 8-9 (2004) (discussing use of stealth-marketing
tactics online).
Copyright owners large and small recognize the value of usergenerated content services in helping generate “buzz” for their works
and engage more directly with their fans. On Twitter, for example, a
studio wishing to market a movie or a television show will often have
their staff (including actors, writers, or producers) post Tweets with
promotional content. In many cases, it is completely unclear who actually owns the rights to that content. What’s more, media companies and
other copyright owners may deliberately decide not to request removal
of certain user-posted items that include their copyrighted works, be-
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cause those items often provide valuable promotional and brandawareness benefits for the companies.3
These marketing practices confirm the need for a tight red-flag
knowledge standard. By quietly authorizing and deliberately allowing
their content to appear on various online services, major copyright owners have precluded any simple inference that the presence of even “well
known” material amounts to infringement. Service providers seldom
know which instances of such content have been authorized or tolerated
by the rights holder and which have not. And there is no reason to make
them guess. Instead, in the face of reasonable uncertainty about whether something is authorized, the DMCA sensibly permits online services
to await instructions from the copyright owner in the form of a proper
takedown notice. Cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.
Supp. 2d 627, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“EMI itself regularly distributes
works on the internet for free. Because of these activities, EMI’s executives concede that internet users, including MP3tunes’ users and execu-

All of these practices are vividly demonstrated by the extensive record presented to this Court in the Viacom v. YouTube litigation. See Br.
for Defendants-Appellees, at 44-53, Nos. 10-3270-CV & 10-3342-CV,
2011 WL 1356930 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2011); Br. for Defendants-Appellees
at 13-14, No. 13-1720-CV, 2013 WL 5870383 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 2013).
3
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tives, have no way of knowing for sure whether free songs on the internet are unauthorized.”).
Fair Use. Finally, even if a service provider has reason to know
that a given item is unauthorized, fair use must still be considered before being required to remove that item under the DMCA. Cf. Lenz v.
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (copyright
owners must make a good-faith consideration of fair use before sending
takedown notices). This requires answering a number of additional
questions: What was the nature of the original work? How much of that
work was used? What was the purpose of the use? Is it a parody? Is the
use commercial? How much does the use transform the original into
something new? What is the effect of the new use on the market for the
original work? See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578-94 (1994) (assessing whether parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” was
fair use); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding reproduction of concert posters to be fair use).
A fair use determination is a notoriously “open-ended and contextsensitive inquiry.” Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that the task of determining
18
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fair use “is not to be simplified with bright-line rules” and instead calls
for a “case-by-case analysis.”). Even courts struggle with these issues,
often leading to nuanced, highly fact-specific rulings. See, e.g., Cariou v.
Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705-11 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding artist’s use of certain photographs to be fair, while remanding for further consideration
as to other photographs).
The fair use issues confronting online services like amici are particularly vexing (and important) given the myriad ways that Internet
users rely on existing works to create new expression. User-submitted
material frequently uses well-known songs, movies, TV shows, and
books as springboards for creative expression. Clips or pieces of such
works are incorporated in the spirit of analysis, commentary, or parody.
Music and video are “remixed,” “mashed-up,” or otherwise transformed
into fan-fictions, image art, tributes, and commentary pieces. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
961 (2004). Users add popular music to their home videos, add their
own words to existing works, and reconfigure the news into comedy.
See, e.g., Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52 (case involving home video of
kids dancing to Prince’s “Let’s Go Crazy”); http://textsfromhillary
19
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clinton.tumblr.com (Tumblr blog combining photograph of Hillary Clinton on her Blackberry with photographs of other politicians and celebrities on their phones with satirical captions); https://twitter.com/
NYTMinusContext (Twitter account that creates amusing Tweets by
copying short excerpts from The New York Times, but out of context).
Copyright owners often approve of (or tolerate) such uses, believing that they stimulate the market for their works and not wanting to
antagonize fans. See, e.g., Casey Fiesler, Everything I Need To Know I
Learned from Fandom: How Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the
Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
729, 758 (2008) (“Just as many authors turn a blind eye to, or even encourage, fan fiction, some media corporations have publicly stated that
they have no problem with fanvids and mash-ups.”). Properly applied,
the red-flag knowledge provision gives fair use the room it needs by not
forcing service providers to make judgment calls about whether uses
like these are infringing. Instead, any item that raises a legitimate
question about fair use cannot be a red flag.
Under this standard, online services can allow users to post items
that incorporate even well-known copyrighted material in ways that
20
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have a legitimate claim to fair use. This lets creators create and preserves the Internet as an open platform for free expression and transformative creation. Cf. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d
1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (“First Amendment privileges are also preserved through the doctrine of fair use.”). By giving space to fair use in
this way, the DMCA helps “fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575
(quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.)).
III. Broadening The DMCA’s Knowledge Standards Would
Frustrate The Statute’s Goals By Discouraging Providers
From Monitoring Content And Helping Users Find It
Relieving online services from having to resolve difficult copyright
questions advances very practical objectives. The narrow cast of the
DMCA’s knowledge provisions recognizes that providers interact with
user-submitted content in a variety of ways. These interactions are extremely valuable. They protect services from offensive, malicious, and
other objectionable material. And they allow services to help users locate the content and information most relevant and interesting to them.
Departing from these standards would create serious disincentives for
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engaging with content in these ways. Congress did not intend that, and
it would have pernicious consequences for services and their users.
A.

Congress Gave Online Services Broad Leeway To Review
User-Submitted Material For Pornography And Other Objectionable Content

While the DMCA makes clear that service providers have no obligation to look through user-submitted content for possible copyright infringements (§ 512(m)), the statute was “not intended to discourage the
service provider from monitoring its service.” H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at
73 (1998). That Congress wanted to remove obstacles to voluntary monitoring is confirmed by the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),
which was enacted shortly before the DMCA. Section 230 of the CDA
gives broad leeway to online computer services to review and remove
objectionable content from their systems. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (no
online service “shall be held liable” on account of “any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable”).
Taking up that invitation, most online services, including amici,
make some effort to review the items posted on their services looking for
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illegal or other objectionable material—including obscenity, child pornography, sexually explicit content, hate speech, sexual harassment,
bullying, graphic violence, threats, and spam. Such content is prohibited by most providers’ terms of use. See, e.g., Pinterest “Acceptable Use
Policy,” https://about.pinterest.com/en/acceptable-use-policy; “The Twitter Rules,” https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules.
As Tumblr’s “Community Guidelines” explain, online services “draw
lines around a few narrowly defined but deeply important categories of
content and behavior that jeopardize our users, threaten our infrastructure, and damage our community.” http://www.tumblr.com/policy/
en/community.
Service providers police these rules in different ways. Pinterest allows users to report objectionable material, which is then reviewed by
employees. Tumblr employs a team that works to remove offending content. Twitter’s “Trust & Safety” team similarly reviews reports and establishes policies to protect its users from abuse on the service. See
Kashmir Hill, Meet Del Harvey, Twitter’s Troll Patrol, Forbes, July 21,
2014, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/02/
meet-del-harvey-twitters-troll-patrol/. These efforts require service pro23
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viders to interact with user-submitted content. Without looking at an
item, a provider can’t determine whether the content violates its policies. Automated technologies can help, but there’s ultimately no substitute for human beings. See Del Harvey, The Strangeness of Scale at
Twitter, TED, March 2014, available at http://www.ted.com/talks/
del_harvey_the_strangeness_of_scale_at_twitter/.
Making efforts to remove offensive, objectionable, or illegal material benefits online services, their users, and the public. While most users of services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter contribute legitimate
content, there is always a minority that abuses the freedom that online
platforms offer. Videos depicting child abuse, sexual torture, or graphic
violence; postings that harass or bully others; messages aimed at defrauding members of the public—such content deeply offends users and
can put them at risk of harm. It also distracts from the legitimate material that more responsible users post and undermines the community
that online services are trying to build. Consistent with their commitment to protecting freedom of speech, service providers thus have con-
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siderable cause to monitor user-submitted content in ways that have
nothing to do with looking for possible copyright infringement.4
As indicated above, Congress approved of such review and wanted
to eliminate disincentives for service providers to engage in it. The
DMCA’s knowledge provisions reflect that understanding. By insisting
that infringement be truly obvious, the DMCA allows online services to
continue their valuable content-review efforts without exposing themselves to loss of the safe harbor because they do not remove material
that may turn out to have been infringing. This affords much-needed
breathing space to service providers. Without it, they would be faced
with a stark choice between preserving their DMCA protection and taking steps to stamp out harmful and even unlawful uses of their services.
That is not what Congress wanted.

Reviewing content for terms-of-use violations is fundamentally different from investigating infringement. As discussed above, discerning
what is infringing requires a complex analysis based on information not
readily apparent from the content itself. By contrast, whether material
is pornographic or excessively violent can be determined simply by looking at it. And, unlike with copyright infringement, there is typically no
third-party better positioned to make the necessary assessments.
4
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The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions Were Crafted To Allow
Service Providers To Review Online Material To Help Users
Find What They Want

Online services also have more positive reasons for interacting
with user-submitted content. Service providers play an important role
in classifying and organizing material on the Internet, and human review is often needed to do so effectively. By helping users find relevant
items in what may be a sea of content, these interactions make online
services more useful and better able to facilitate creative expression. In
enacting the DMCA, Congress expressly recognized the importance of
this kind of manual review and crafted the statute’s strict knowledge
standard specifically to give services the room needed to do it.
Online services like Pinterest, Tumblr, and Twitter facilitate access by users to a massive amount of content, with new material pouring in constantly from every corner of the globe. Without at least some
order and organization, users may not be able to find what they’re looking for, and the best and most interesting postings may get lost. To prevent that, service providers take steps to help users identify and more
readily access the content that is particularly relevant and interesting
to their users.
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These organizational measures often demand engagement with
users’ material. Service providers review and classify user-submitted
items to make them easier to find. This puts employees of the service in
direct contact with those items as they try to determine the appropriate
“tag” to place so that subsequent users’ searches return responsive material. Likewise, providers may sift through postings in an effort to decide which ones should be placed on what portions of the service, which
might be of special value, or which may create unique excitement.
Tumblr, for example, categorizes blogs by subject matter (such as architecture, fashion, and travel) to help its users discover relevant and compelling content. Twitter has a custom timelines feature that allows users (and Twitter’s own staff) to create a timeline of Tweets related in
some useful manner. See https://blog.twitter.com/2013/introducingcustom-timelines.
The public benefit of such interactions can be illustrated by the
role that Twitter and other services played in the Arab Spring of 2011.
By highlighting and tagging relevant posts, these services made it possible for users across the globe to track and join the conversation, for
those on the ground to share their experiences with an engaged audi27
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ence, and for media outlets and governments to observe conditions and
trends in real-time. See Philip N. Howard, et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?,
Project on Information Technology and Political Islam, Sept. 11, 2011,
available at http://pitpi.org/?p=1051.
Even in less politically impactful scenarios, service providers’ content-organization efforts are important. By interacting with usersubmitted material, providers can bring the best and most interesting
content to the fore. This benefits talented amateur artists and creators,
whose works otherwise might not get the recognition they deserve. For
example, each day Tumblr’s “Radar” feature shines a spotlight on a
handful of posts from the service’s millions of active bloggers that most
captivate Tumblr’s staff. Radar sparks conversation across the network
and helps inspire users’ creativity. Being included in Radar gives the
featured bloggers and their content more attention, often significantly
increasing their views, followers, and interactions.
Organizing content effectively also helps users find and bond with
like-minded individuals. This community-building is one of the most
important features offered by online service providers, and it often re28
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quires some involvement on the part of service providers’ employees.
See, e.g., https://www.tumblr.com/meetups. Community managers may
need to participate in user groups to respond to questions or complaints,
to remove images unrelated to the purpose of the group, or to help identify content that would be especially interesting to the community.
In enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized the importance of allowing service providers to use human review to help make online content more accessible. As the legislative history explains: “Information
location tools are essential to operation of the Internet; without them,
users would not be able to find the information they need.” S. REP. NO.
105-190, at 49. The use of “human judgment and editorial discretion” in
organizing content is particularly “valuable” in this regard, and protecting such interactions was a key goal of the DMCA safe harbors:
[T]here is concern that online directories prepared by human
editors and reviewers, who view and classify various Internet sites, would be denied eligibility to the information location tools safe harbor, in an unintended number of cases and
circumstances. This is an important concern because such
online directories play a valuable role in assisting Internet
users to identify and locate the information they seek on the
decentralized and dynamic networks of the Internet.
Id. at 48-49.
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The strict knowledge rules that Congress crafted were integral to
this protection. By precluding a finding of knowledge absent actual
knowledge or “red flags” making infringement “obvious” based on a
“brief and casual viewing,” the DMCA was designed to ensure that
online services would be able to “view and classify” online content so
that their users can “identify and locate the information they seek.” Id.
And Congress clearly instructed that the “knowledge or awareness
standard should not be applied in a manner which would create a disincentive to the development of directories which involve human intervention.” Id. at 49 (emphasis added).5
Unfortunately, this is exactly what the decision below does. Suggesting that red-flag knowledge exists merely because Vimeo employees

This legislative history relates to the § 512(d) safe harbor, but it
applies equally to § 512(c). For one thing, the red-flag knowledge provisions in the two safe harbors are identical. Compare § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)
with § 512(d)(1)(B). For another, this Court has squarely held that
§ 512(c) covers functions “performed for the purpose of facilitating access to user-stored material.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 39 (internal marks
and citation omitted). This safe harbor does not require services to be
passive “storage lockers”; instead, like § 512(d), it allows them to interact with user-submitted content in ways that help users “locate and
gain access” to that material. Id. at 39-40 (internal marks and citation
omitted).
5
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interacted with user-posted items that used “well known” copyrighted
works ignores Congress’s instruction that a service provider should not
lose the safe harbor “merely because it saw one or more well known
photographs of a celebrity.” Id. at 48. By departing from this standard,
that ruling threatens to deter providers from using human intervention
to help arrange or catalogue the content on their systems. Not only does
that frustrate a key purpose of the DMCA, it would materially diminish
the quality of online services. They would be less organized, users would
have a harder time finding or identifying the items they want, and the
most deserving content might get lost amid an undifferentiated mass of
user-submitted material.
C.

Proper Application Of The DMCA’s Knowledge Provisions
Protects Legitimate Online Expression

By removing the need to make difficult judgments about infringement, the DMCA gives service providers freedom to limit objectionable content and to keep the material on their systems organized
and accessible. The district court’s decision threatens to erode that freedom, by applying red-flag knowledge more expansively than Congress
intended. Such an application would have profound consequences for
service providers, their users, and the Internet more broadly.
31
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If they are unable to review user-submitted material without fear
that every missed infringement might cost them the safe harbor, service
providers will be left with two distasteful choices. First, they could stop
engaging with user content altogether. While that might help avoid a
finding of knowledge, it would profoundly diminish the quality of online
services for all the reasons discussed above: it would allow highly offensive and even unlawful content to run unchecked, while leaving service
providers unable to make good content more easily available to users.
Alternatively, service providers could respond by removing any
user-posted items they find that raise even a question about copyright
infringement. That result would be just as bad. Inevitably, much of the
material that would be removed in such purges would not be infringing.
What seemed questionable would turn out to be original, approved by
the copyright owner, or fair use. Eliminating such innocent content does
a disservice to users and the public. It would take important voices out
of the cultural conversation, demoralize users trying to make themselves heard, and leave online services far less free and open. Cf. Wolk,
840 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (“[A] policy under which Photobucket assumes
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infringement could result in Photobucket unlawfully blocking others
from uploading images to which they hold valid licenses.”).
This would be especially problematic when it comes to fair use.
Fair use is “an integral part of copyright, whose observance is necessary
to achieve the objectives of that law.” Blanch, 467 F.3d at 250 (internal
marks and citation omitted). As described above, services like amici
host many user-submitted items that are legitimate candidates for fairuse protection—image mash-ups and memes on Tumblr; short, sixsecond video clips on Twitter; and thumbnail photographs linking to
full-size images on other websites posted on Pinterest, just to give a few
examples. Removing such material would deprive users of their right to
appropriate existing culture into new works. And it would diminish the
public’s ability to view, enjoy, and be inspired by those creations. This
result has serious consequences for free expression online—the “unnecessary removal of non-infringing material causes significant injury to
the public where time-sensitive or controversial subjects are involved.”
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; cf. Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1277 (where a
“viable fair use defense is available,” issuing an injunction is “at odds
with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright
33
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law”). And all of this is contrary to the DMCA’s purpose to ensure “that
the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to expand.” S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
CONCLUSION
For nearly two decades, the DMCA has helped the Internet flourish by allowing online services to interact with user-submitted content
in various beneficial ways. Proper application of the statute’s knowledge
standards is integral to the protections that the DMCA provides. The
district court misapplied those standards and deprived Vimeo of the
safe harbor. This Court should correct that error.
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